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COMMAND

MAGAZINE

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND

SALT

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Soviet *TU-16* Badger bomber in flight (top) and U.S. *F-4* fighter aircraft.

An active and creative foreign policy is more than desirable for the United States on abstract grounds. Such a policy, despite its admitted risks, is essential. Deep and continuing domestic divisions, such as we have seen most recently in Iran, can tempt outsiders to intervene for their own purposes. International economic problems have grown to such a magnitude that they pose a threat to international trade and investment. A number of ancient disputes, most notably in southern Europe and the Middle East, have explosive possibilities. The collapse of 19th-century empires in the wake of World War II has left large post-colonial problems in Africa and Asia. The continued strength of nationalism has contributed to divisions between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC), between the Soviet Union and its restive East European buffers, and, upon occasion, even within NATO itself.

Many of the same forces that have led to these troubles have also brought about the international sabotage and terror that contribute further to domestic and international instability. Where differences have continued unresolved, nations have turned to the international market for the acquisition of modern conventional arms, and some may even be tempted by the lure of nuclear weapons.

Whether the Soviet Union would act more constructively in a less turbulent world is, of course, impossible to say. We can only note that in existing circumstances, the Soviet Union remains a major force for instability—not the only one but the biggest one.

Views differ on exactly why the Soviets persist in this role. However, the facts of their contribution to instability are hardly a secret. Domestically, they have perpetuated a political system of such authoritarianism, secrecy, and internal repression that they inevitably trail a cloud of suspicion and doubt about their intentions and motives wherever they go. Internationally, the Soviets have continued to encourage groups seeking to undermine established

By Dr. Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense

governments, sponsor so-called wars of national liberation, seek permanent footholds with their clients, and frequently oppose the constructive settlement of international disputes.

Most disturbing of all, the Soviets have undertaken a long-term military buildup that still continues after more than 15 years. What lies behind this buildup is a subject for debate. There can be no doubt, however, about the fact of the buildup itself.

We have attempted to measure the scale of the Soviet effort in a number of different ways: by estimating what would have been the costs if we had made a comparable effort in the U.S. economy; by calculating what the posture and programs must have cost in the Soviet economy; and by comparing physical outputs wherever possible with what the United States has produced. Each method has its own drawbacks. But all of them underline certain indisputable trends. Among the most significant of those trends should be counted:

- The steady growth of the Soviet defense effort. Over a period of more than 15 years, the growth rate has probably averaged in the vicinity of three percent a year in dollars, and between four and five percent a year in rubles. In other words, this growth has been at about the same rate as the growth in the overall Soviet economy.
- The general magnitude of the effort. We estimate that, on the average, it has accounted for somewhere between 11 and 13 percent of gross national product (GNP). Other analysts put the level of effort at 15 percent or higher.
- The size of the effort relative to that of the United States. We believe that when the two programs are measured in U.S. prices, the Soviet effort came to equal ours by about 1971, and now exceeds it by something like 25 to 45 percent (with retirement costs excluded on both sides), depending on whether the ruble or the dollar measure is used. The general character of these trends is shown in Chart 1.

These trends in the level of resources allocated to defense are consistent with what we know about the growth and improvement in Soviet military capabilities. Military manpower, as shown in Chart 2, has risen from about 3.4 million in 1964 to roughly 4.4 million in 1978—not

DEFENSE news briefs

NATO Celebrates 30th Anniversary

April 4 of this year marks the 30th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty and subsequent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a defense alliance of 15 western nations which has successfully deterred aggression in Europe and the North Atlantic countries during the three decades of its existence.

Although controversy continues over the effectiveness of NATO versus the Warsaw Pact forces, the imbalance of East-West power and the vulnerability of Western Europe were matters of dramatic proportion in 1949 when the alliance was established. Except for scattered units of American, British and French forces, Western Europe was nearly defenseless before the Soviet force of more than four million men.

At that time, the recognized need for a mutual defense alliance among concerned Western nations had been sparked by the spring 1948 coup d'etat in Prague and other threats of continuing Communist aggression in Europe. During the autumn of 1948, negotiations were begun among the five Brussels Treaty countries—Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom—and Canada and the United States. The following spring, these countries asked Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal to join the proposed defense alliance, and on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by those 12 countries. Subsequently, Greece and Turkey acceded to NATO in 1952, and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955.

During the 30 years of its existence, NATO has added new dimensions to its policies and activities.

NATO's most significant accomplishment, as it observes its 30th anniversary, is what has not occurred: there has been no war in Europe.

Military Medicine

Military medicine in the Armed Forces is not meeting either its wartime or peacetime missions, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) Robert Pirie told Congress recently.

A major war might cause a casualty load in the first month to the extent we would have to airlift our wounded home for care in civilian hospitals, he said.

Team Spirit 4

Combined forces from the Republic of Korea and the United States held its fourth annual defensive operations maneuver recently called "**Team Spirit**."

Team Spirit was entirely defensive training. All air, land, sea exercises were held well south of the demilitarized zone.

Contracting Out

Air Force will contract out 240 stock clerk positions at 14 of its CONUS commissaries in line with the government policy to convert some federal civil service positions that can be performed by private contractors.

LAMPS Now Seahawk

Navy has given the popular name, **Seahawk**, to its Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) MK-III, the SH-60B.

Army Raises Enlistment Bonus

Army's new $3,000 enlistment bonus to recruits who enlist for Armor has some important stipulations and requirements and is not available to everyone who wants to sign up for it.

To be eligible for the program that began in January 1979, the recruit must be a non-prior service enlistee, a high school graduate, and test out in mental categories I-III.

He must also enlist for four years.

This is the first time the Army has used the $3,000 limit the law allows. In the past, $2,500 was the highest amount offered.

counting armed border guards and internal security police. Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles-ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles-SLBMs, and heavy bombers) have risen from approximately 450 in 1964 to 2,500 in 1978. While their peripheral attack forces have not increased significantly in numbers, older soviet systems are being augmented or replaced by the much more sophisticated *SS-22 mobile*, multiple independent reentry vehicle (*MIRV*ed) independent reentry ballistic missile (*IRBM*) and the *BACKFIRE* bomber. The ground forces have been expanded from148 divisions in 1964 to more than 170 divisions in 1978, and Frontal Aviation (the Soviet tactical air forces) has gone from about 3,500 to 4,500 first-line combat aircraft. Both the ground and the tactical air forces have been extensively modernized.

The Soviets already have an open-ocean navy. During the past decade, it has seen more qualitative improvement than quantitative growth. With the appearance of two light aircraft carriers (a third is under construction) and a large ocean-going amphibious ship with surface-effect landing craft, and with the fitting-out of what could be a large, nuclear-powered cruiser, we may now be witnessing the beginnings of a true naval power projection capability. In sum, the Soviets have finally arrived in most respects as a modern military power with a limited global reach.

The seriousness with which the Soviets have undertaken—and

give every sign of continuing—this effort is as impressive as its magnitude. One reflection of that seriousness is the emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on the achievement of balanced war-fighting capabilities in both nuclear and non-nuclear forces. Another reflection of seriousness has been the steadiness of purpose evident in the buildup. The Soviets expanded their effort as our own grew in the 1960s. But theirs continued to expand as ours began to decline.

Their programs seem to have been equally insensitive to the possibility that we might react and intensify the competition. Although it is clear in retrospect that we had the superior technology, the Soviets did not hestitate to try for a number of technological firsts. They were the first to deploy *MRBMs* and *IRBMs*, the first to deploy *ICBMs* and anti-ballistic missiles *(ABMs)*, and the first to demonstrate modern anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. Though we have not yet responded with an ASAT of our own, the Soviets continue to work on and test new versions. Other of their initiatives, such as the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) and the MIRVed IRBM, have not seemed worthy of a response. Obviously, we cannot afford to underestimate the Soviet dedication to the achievement of expanding military power, or overestimate the effectiveness of unilateral restraint on our part as a way of controlling or reversing the military competition.

It is essential, at the same time, that we not exaggerate what the



MANPOWER

U.S.-U.S.S.R. ACTIVE DUTY, MILITARY



Soviet buildup has meant for the worldwide balance of military power and its stability. While the Soviets have accomplished a great deal, their accomplishment must be seen in perspective.

For a number of Khrushchev's years, not only did the Soviets spend less than the United States; Khrushchev himself seems to have insisted on his own kind of *New Look*, with a heavy emphasis on the deterrent value of nuclear capabilities, a reduction in ground forces, and a general deemphasis of conventional capabilities. A significant percentage of what we now count as a past buildup in ground and tactical air forces must have gone to a restoration and modernization of the capabilities cut back during those still earlier years.

Even where Soviet strategic nuclear forces are concerned, today's capabilities are so impressive in part because they arose from such a low base. Whether the Soviet efforts in this realm have been worth the cost remains problematic. We ourselves did not find our numerical nuclear superiority particularly useful or usable when we had it. In fact, those were the years of the Berlin blockade and wall, of the North Korean adventure, successive repressions of Czechs, East Germans, Hungarians, and Poles, and the Cuban missile foray. The Soviets, of course, are different. Should they somehow obtain a perceived nuclear superiority, they might mistakenly try to use it for political advantage. But it seems doubtful that they would be any more comforted by nuclear equivalence

than we were by nuclear superiority in the past. Despite their vast nuclear superiority to the PRC, the Soviets have deemed it necessary to station as much as a quarter of their ground and tactical air forces in the vicinity of China.

These differences in force deployments, and in the contributions of allies, are part of what make U.S. and Soviet military capabilities so hard to compare. Some of the Soviet forces deployed along the border with the PRC could, in a matter of months, be redeployed to Eastern Europe. And we cannot be certain that the Soviets would reduce their defense establishment even in the event of restored friendship with the PRC. It remains the case, nonetheless, that they must carry a burden with their Far Eastern deployments—a burden amounting to between 11 to 20 percent of their total defense effort—that we no longer find it necessary to incur on anything like a comparable scale.

The United States, for its part, has long air and sea lines of communication to its allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, and we must pay heavily for their use and protection. But the Soviets have severe geographic problems of their own. Their forces in the Far East subsist at the end of a lengthy and vulnerable railroad line, and even supplies and reinforcements to their forces in East Germany must pass through territory that, in many circumstances, could prove less than hospitable.

Soviet naval forces must cope with particularly awkward operating conditions. Attempts to defend against our nuclear forces are expensive, but do not guarantee much in the way of return. It may cost them less to attack our lines of communication than it costs us to defend them, but even that is not certain. They have long and harrowing distances to go in order to reach those lines of communication (LOCs); they have to invest in the defense of the Ba-

Soviet *STIX* missile being lowered into a launch tube (below) and a *MIG-23* air combat fighter aircraft in flight (left).

dateline: R&D

Transportable air traffic control towers, which can convert an unattended airfield into an "instant airstrip," are being used successfully by the Air Force, Army and Air National Guard. Designed and built by RCA Automated Systems, Burlington, Mass., the towers operate as VFR (Visual Flight Rules) terminals for all types of aircraft and can handle air traffic comparable to that at medium-sized municipal airports.

rents Sea and the Sea of Japan; and they have found it necessary to divide their forces into four separate fleets with poorly located home bases. As the Secretary of the Navy points out, "The Soviet Baltic Fleet can be bottled up in the event of hostilities by mining the Danish Straits. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet can be bottled up by mining the Turkish Straits. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would lead an exciting, but brief, existence in the event of war, and would have no way of getting out of the Mediterranean, the exits to which can easily be mined or blocked by submarines . . .. Large portions of the Soviet Fleet are based at Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan and can be bottled up by similarly closing the straits leading out into the Pacific. The only fleet having a semblance of access to the open oceans is the Northern Fleet, and even that fleet has to travel all the way around Norway and fight its way through the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom gap into the Atlantic Ocean . . ."

To these geographic encumbrances, the Soviets must add a host of other difficulties. They have allies of sorts, to be sure, and we count the forces of those allies in the Warsaw Pact order of battle. But they are allies unlike our own. It would seem plausible that some portion of the Soviet theater capability has at least an additional mission: the need to watch Soviet friends.

The inefficiency of the Soviet economy is another burden the Kremlin must bear. It has been noted with some dismay that the Soviet investment in military research and development may be 75 percent larger than ours. This is a matter of legitimate concern. But several other facts are also worth noting. Our technology, on balance, continues to surpass theirs by a considerable margin. Our allies make a substantial investment in military research and development (R&D), in contrast to the allies of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, for their part, must deal with a civil sector that does not produce technology of use to the military sector to nearly the same extent as ours does. For that reason alone, the Soviets probably have to invest more defense resources than we do to achieve a comparable military result.

There is a significant probability that the current Soviet economic problems will be aggravated in the years ahead. A downturn in the growth of the working-age population in the Soviet Union has already occurred; it will probably continue until the mid-1980s. The average annual rate of increase in GNP has slowed from 5.5 percent between 1966 and 1970 to less than four percent in the last seven years. The growth in industrial production appears to have become sluggish, and the expansion energy production—particularly of oil—has decreased.

As far as we can tell, the slowdown in economic growth has been sharper than the Soviet leadership had anticipated. What it means, inevitably, is that a smaller volume of goods and services is being added each year to be divided among consumption, investment, and defense.

Nonetheless, all of the evidence available to us on Soviet defense programs under way and planned suggests that the long-term trend in allocation of resources to defense is likely to continue into the 1980s.

COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Because of that expectation, and because of what has already occurred, we have good grounds for concern about Soviet intentions as well as Soviet capabilities. It is troublesome that the Soviets place so much emphasis on the competitive side of their relationship with the United States. With so many problems, but with so much military power, a desperate leadership could cause unparalleled international turmoil. Soviet difficulties, in short, will not necessarily redound to our benefit. Those difficulties, as well as Soviet military accomplishments, make it essential that we maintain our defenses.

At the same time, it is well to recall that the basis for a more cooperative relationship continues to exist. In President Carter's words: "We remember that the United States and the Soviet Union were allies in the Second World War . . .. In the agony of that massive conflict, 20 million Soviet lives were lost. Millions more who live in the Soviet Union still recall the horror and the hunger of that time." As the President went on to say, "I am convinced that the people of the Soviet Union want peace. I can't believe that they could possibly want war."

A Soviet six-barrel antisubmarine warfare rocket launcher (right) and flight deck of Soviet aircraft carrier, *Kiev* (below).





The Soviets appear not to have cultivated much of a taste either for great unilateral restraint in their defense decisions, or for reciprocity to U.S. and allied restraint. They have proved willing, however, to engage constructively in a range of negotiations to constrain the military competition on the basis of detailed and verifiable arms control agreements. Undoubtedly they do so principally or at least largely to constrain the United States. Our motive with respect to them is similar. Where mutual constraint is in the interest of both, agreement should be possible.

SALT

Paramount among those negotiations has been SALT—the strategic arms limitation talks be-

tween the United States and the Soviet Union. The ABM treaty of 1972, a major achievement of arms control, remains in force. Although the five-year Interim Agreement on offensive strategic nuclear weapons expired in October 1977, both the Soviet and the U.S. governments have announced their intention to take no actions inconsistent with the terms of the Agreement as negotiations continue on a replacement—SALT II. We are now close to such an agreement.

The SALT II agreement will consist of three parts:

- a basic Agreement which would be in force through 1985;
- a Protocol of about three years' duration and
- a Joint Statement of Principles to guide future negotiations.

The SALT II agreement, as it now stands, will provide for:

- an equal aggregate limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and long-range air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). This ceiling, initially, will be set at 2,400 vehicles, as agreed at Vladivostok in 1974. It will subsequently be lowered to 2,250;
- an equal aggregate limit of 1,320 on the total number of MIRVed ballistic missile launchers and aircraft equipped with long-range cruise missiles;
- a limit of 1,200 on the total number of MIRVed ballistic missile launchers;
- a limit of 820 on MIRVed ICBM launchers;
- in effect, a ban on increasing the number of fixed heavy ICBM launchers;
- a ban on the construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers;
- limits on the introduction of new ICBMs;
- an agreement to exchange data on the numbers of strategic weapons systems in constrained categories, and
- advance notification of certain ICBM test launches.

The agreement will also include provisions to enhance verification, such as; bans on interference with national technical means of verification and on deliberate measures of concealment that impede verification by national technical means. The agreement will also establish counting rules to facilitate verification of the MIRV and bomber limits; and a provision outlining the duties of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in connection with the SALT II agreement. The agreement will include a ban on circumvention of its provisions. However, SALT II will not interfere with continued nuclear or conventional cooperation with our allies.

We have taken the position that the Soviet *BACKFIRE* bomber can be excluded from the aggregate defined by the SALT II agreement only provided that the Soviets undertake commitments to inhibit *BACKFIRE's* effective use in an intercontinental role, and to impose limits on its production rate. Soviet compliance with these commitments will be essential to the obligations assumed under the SALT agreement.

The Protocol will allow development and flight-testing of air-launched, ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles to unlimited range, but will ban for its duration the deployment of ground and sea launched cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. There will be no maximum on the range permitted for deployed ALCMs. The Protocol will ban flight-testing and deployment, but not development, of missiles for ground-mobile and air-mobile ICBM launchers. We have proposed that the Protocol expire in 1981, and, in any case, before the initial operating capabilities of our affected cruise missile programs or the initial flight tests of U.S. mobile ICBMs.

The United States will not deploy a mobile ICBM system that would prevent adequate verification of the number of launchers deployed. We will insist that any Soviet system meet the same verification standards. It is our government's view that those parts of the joint draft text of the SALT II agreement already agreed to allow deployment of mobile ICBM systems of the types we are considering. The draft agreement explicitly permits deployment of mobile ICBM launchers during its term, but after the expiration of the Protocol period, which would end well before mobile ICBM systems could be ready for deployment.

The limitations in the Protocol in no way set a precedent for the way in which SALT III will deal with any of these systems. The rest of the agreement will survive as a self-contained commitment after Protocol expiration. Any future limits on the systems covered in the Protocol (other than those already contained in the basic agreement) will require U.S. agreement and Congressional approval.

In the Joint Statement of Principles to guide SALT III, the two sides have agreed to seek further reductions in the ceilings of SALT II, further qualitative limitations on strategic systems, strengthened verification, and resolution of the issues temporarily covered by the Protocol. Each side, in addition, may raise any issue related to the further limitation of strategic arms.

It would be a mistake to believe that a SALT II agreement along these lines, by itself, will solve all our defense problems or end the strategic nuclear competition. It will not. It would also be a mistake to pretend that such a SALT agreement will be ideal from the standpoint of the United States or, for that matter, of the Soviet Union. It will not be, though it is the best agreement that both sides will accept.

In recognizing the limits of SALT, it would equally be a mistake to ignore the important ways in which the agreement will contribute to our society. Those contributions will be lost if we do not have a SALT agreement.

I say this for a number of reasons. The agreement will firmly establish the principle of equal aggregates by fixing and equalizing the total number of strategic delivery vehicles each side can have. As a consequence, it will require the dismantling of several hundred operational Soviet





The SALT Agreement will allow the United States to continue the planned development of such new weapons as may be needed to ensure this nation's and allied security. These buried trench (above) and shelter based missile concepts are an example.

strategic delivery vehicles, but will not require any such reductions on the part of the United States. It will hold the deployment of Soviet strategic forces well below the number they would be capable of deploying during the period of the agreement, but would not prevent the United States from making some additions to our deployments. The provisions limiting new types of ICBMs are potentially among the most important in the agreement because they constrain qualitative improvement

The agreement will allow us to continue the planned development of such new weapons as we may need to ensure our own and allied security. At the same time, it will reduce uncertainty about the nature of Soviet strategic forces in the 1980s, and thus make it easier to plan our own.

I should emphasize that SALT II will not result in any reduction in the recourses we allocate to our strategic forces during the life of the agreement. The resource level may well have to be higher than now, though lower than during the 1960s (in constant dollar terms). But the growth will still be considerably less than if there were no agreement. Perhaps most important of all, in addition to its direct benefits, this agreement will constitute another step in a difficult and delicate process that could lead not only to greater international stability and reduced competition, but also to closer cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the creation of a more peaceful world order.

Questions will undoubtedly arise about our ability to verify soviet compliance with the terms of SALT II. We have considered the issue carefully and, based on our experience with SALT I, together with the foreseeable provisions of SALT II, we believe that our verification procedures will be adequate for this purpose. To detect violations of arms control agreement with the Soviets, we have been employing a set of in-

telligence capabilities known as "national technical means." As the President has stated, photo-reconnaissance satellites constitute one of them. These means have enabled us to monitor many aspects of the development, testing, production, deployment, training, and operation of Soviet strategic capabilities, despite the closed nature of Soviet society.

The SALT I agreements recognized the role of these national technical means in verifying compliance with their terms. They also required that neither side interfere with these means or resort to deliberate concealment that impedes verification. A U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was also established to deal with issues of interpretation and compliance. In the years since SALT I was signed, the United States has raised with the Soviets in the SCC a number of unusual or ambiguous activities that were, or could become, grounds for more serious concern. The Soviets have also raised issues with us. In every case we raised, either the activity ceased or we obtained an acceptable explanation of it from the Soviets. In short, one of the most important benefits of SALT has been that it legitimizes U.S. monitoring of Soviet strategic weapons development and deployment, and prohibits Soviet interference with such monitoring acitivities.

We and the Soviets are now tightening up and codifying these verification procedures for SALT II in a more rigorous way. I am confident that SALT II will be adequately verifiable. We believe that, to go undetected, any Soviet cheating would have to be on such a small scale that it would not be of any military significance. Not only would any cheating serious enough to affect the terms of the agreement be detectable; we would discover it in sufficient time to take whatever action the situation required. None of the above comment is intended either to condone or to predict cheating, whatever its scale. We expect compliance with any agreement, and we intend to verify that compliance.

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COVER: Soviet Foxtrot class diesel submarine at anchor.

CHANGE OF COMMAND

Reassignments

Lt. Gen. Bennie L. Davis, Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Personnel, Hq. USAF, was named Commander, Air Training Command. He also was nominated for promotion to general.

Maj. Gen. Andrew P. Iosue, Commander, Air Force Military Training Center at Lackland AFB, Texas, succeeds Gen. Davis as Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Personnel, Hq. USAF. He has been nominated for promotion to lieutenant general.

RAdm Lee Baggett Jr., Commander, Naval Surface Group, Middle Pacific, becomes Commander, Naval Surface Force, Pacific. He has been nominated for promotion to vice admiral.

Appointments

Maj. Gen. Frederick H. Lawson, USAR, CG 91st Div. (Training) and Vice President, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Co., has been appointed to a three year term on the Reserve Forces Policy Board.

Retirement

Gen. John J. Hennessey, USA, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Readiness Command, has been nominated for retirement in his current grade, effective Aug. 1, 1979.

VAdm. William R. St. George, Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was nominated for retirement in his current grade effective June 1, 1979

New Post

Robert H. Pirie Jr. has been nominated by the President to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), a post in which he has been serving as Acting Assistant Secretary since Dr. John P. White left for the White House to serve as Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget.

Promotions

The following Navy Captains of the staff corps have been promoted temporarily to Rear Admiral **Clinton Hershey Lowery,** Medical Corps; **Duncan Philip McGillivary** and **Richard Earl Curtis,** Supply Corps; **Ross Henry Trower,** Chaplain Corps; **James Theodore Taylor,** Civil Engineer Corps; **James Duncan Enoch,** Dental Corps.



Gen. Hennessey

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
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